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Summary
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), with a current annual budget of
$5.0 billion, is the primary agency charged with enforcing the nation’s immigration law.
Regulating immigration can be viewed as having two basic components: stemming illegal
immigration (enforcement) and facilitating legal immigration (service).  The Bush
Administration supports separating service from enforcement.  While no legislation to
restructure INS has been introduced in the 107th Congress at this date, it is likely that
proposals will be introduced in the future, since restructuring may necessitate amending
existing statutory authorities.  For now, Members of Congress, who support
restructuring INS, are waiting to review the Bush Administration’s plan before
introducing legislation themselves.  
Previously, the Clinton Administration had initiated steps to restructure INS
internally by separating the agency’s enforcement and service functions, but sought to
maintain the statutory authority for both functions under a single executive who would
integrate immigration policy, standards, and operations.  While there is no statutory
requirement that the Administration gain Congress’s formal approval of any agency
reorganization, Congress could choose to mandate legislatively that INS be dismantled
or reorganized differently.  Indeed, on March 22, 2000, the House Judiciary’s
Immigration and Claims Subcommittee approved legislation to dismantle INS.  Without
the support of key Members of Congress, the Clinton Administration did not move
forcefully to complete its INS restructuring plan. This report will be updated to reflect
legislative action.  (For further analysis, see CRS Report RL30257, Proposals to
Restructure the Immigration and Naturalization Service.)
Introduction
While there have been many proposals to reorganize the federal immigration system
in the past, the most recent proposals were prompted in part by a series of
recommendations made by the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.  The
CRS-2
1 The creation of the Commission on Immigration Reform was mandated by the Immigration Act
of 1990 (P.L. 101-649; 104 Stat. 5001) to examine legal immigration policy.
2 U.S. General Accounting Office. INS Management: Follow-up on Selected Problems. GGD-97-
132, Washington, July 1997.
3 National Academy of Public Administration. Budgeting for Performance: Strategy, Flexibility,
and Accountability to Meet a Demanding Mission.  Washington, January 1997.
commission recommended that the federal immigration system be fundamentally
restructured by, among other things, dismantling INS.  The commission described INS as
an agency suffering from conflicting priorities and mission overload, whose service and
enforcement missions were incompatible.1  
The Clinton Administration categorically rejected the idea that INS should be
dismantled, and moved forward to restructure INS internally by separating  immigration
services and enforcement functions.  By establishing clear chains of command, clear roles
and responsibilities, appropriate coordinating mechanisms, and flexible resource
management, the Clinton Administration asserted that it could achieve four goals: greater
accountability, enhanced customer service, seamless enforcement, and a coherent
immigration system.  
Many questioned what prevented INS from achieving these goals previously, for  INS
has experienced tremendous growth in its budget and staff: from $1.5 billion and 18,000
funded positions in FY1993, to $5.0 billion and nearly 34,000 funded positions in FY2001.
Nonetheless, INS continues to come under fire for not meeting its obligations under the
law.  Large pending caseloads plague INS.  Border control and security remains an
ongoing issue for Congress.  And, the agency struggles to deport criminal aliens in an
expeditious manner.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) and others also enumerated many
longstanding problems within INS.  In July 1997, GAO issued a report on INS
management,2 in which it found that INS had made some progress, but many longstanding
issues had yet to be adequately addressed. According to GAO, INS had established a
strategic plan and a priorities-based management process, but other changes had
exacerbated unclear lines of accountability and poor intra-agency communications and
coordination.  In addition, GAO reported findings of  the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA)3 related to weaknesses in INS’s budget planning, formulation, and
execution process.  Neither GAO nor NAPA, however, recommended restructuring the
agency to more clearly separate INS’s enforcement and service functions as a solution to
the agency’s problems.  Rather, GAO and NAPA recommended clarifying existing lines
of accountability and communication and improving the agency’s financial accounting,
budget, and resource allocation processes.
Legislative Proposals to Restructure INS in the 105th Congress 
Restructuring INS emerged as a legislative issue when FY1998 Commerce-Justice-
State (CJS) appropriations report language directed the Attorney General to review
recommendations made by the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform and submit a plan
to Congress to restructure INS specifically and the federal immigration system generally
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(P.L. 105-119; H.Rept. 105-207).  In its final report to Congress, the commission
recommended that the processing of legal immigration and naturalization claims be
transferred to the Department of State.  With the exception of worksite enforcement and
detention, INS enforcement programs would remain at the Department of Justice as an
elevated enforcement bureau.  INS’s responsibility for worksite enforcement would be
transferred to the Department of Labor.  The commission suggested turning over most of
INS’s detention operations to the U.S. Marshals Service or the Bureau of Prisons (BOP).
The commission also recommended that an independent appeals board be set up to handle
all administrative appeals of immigration-related determinations made by the Departments
of State, Justice, and Labor.
The commission’s recommendations were wide-ranging and on such a scale that their
implementation would be complicated and, most likely, incremental.  The commission
maintained that, by separating INS’s enforcement and service functions, management and
budget efficiencies could be achieved.  The commission’s recommendations followed on
the heels of a number of INS-related controversies, like Citizenship-USA, which lent
momentum to proposals to restructure INS.
The Clinton Administration’s Framework for Change
In FY1998, the Clinton Administration hired a private firm, Booz-Allen & Hamilton,
to examine the agency’s enforcement and service missions, and establish a plan to increase
managerial accountability.  The Booz-Allen report served as the basis for INS’s report to
Congress entitled Framework for Change, which was submitted to the House and Senate
appropriations committees on April 1, 1998.  In this report, the Administration
acknowledged that the Commission on Immigration Reform had correctly identified many
longstanding problems within INS, such as insufficient accountability between field and
headquarters, competing priorities within field offices, lack of consistency in application
of the law, a need for greater professionalism, overlapping organizational relationships,
and significant management weaknesses.4  Representative Harold Rogers, then chairman
of the CJS appropriations subcommittee, expressed his strong dissatisfaction with this
report: in his view, it did not adequately address the commission’s recommendations. 
On July 17, 1998, Representative Rogers introduced H.R. 4264, a bill that was very
similar to a proposal introduced earlier by Representative Reyes (H.R. 2588).  H.R. 4264
would have separated INS enforcement programs (Border Patrol, inspections,
investigations, detention and deportation, and intelligence) and all attributable support
assets, and created a Bureau of Enforcement and Border Affairs as a stand-alone agency
in the Department of Justice.  The House Judiciary Immigration Subcommittee approved
H.R. 4264, as amended, on July 30, 1998.  The bill was scheduled for full committee
markup, but this never occurred as the full committee turned its attention to impeachment
of the President.
Attempts to insert restructuring language in the FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act
prompted the Clinton Administration to renew its efforts to restructure INS internally.  On
October 7, 1998, INS management established a Restructuring Office and contracted with
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PricewaterhouseCoopers to develop a blueprint to restructure the agency based on A
Framework for Change, the Booz-Allen report described above.  The Clinton
Administration’s preliminary plan called for separating the agency’s service and
enforcement operations and establishing two distinct lines of command within the agency
for those operations.  At headquarters, the Commissioner’s Office would have been
supported by an Office of Chief Financial Officer and an Office for Strategy, and there
would have been three offices headed by Associate Commissioners for 1) enforcement, 2)
immigrant services, and 3) shared support.  In the field, the current structure of regions
and district offices would have been eliminated and replaced with two structures, one for
enforcement, the other for immigrant services.  The Office of Shared Support would have
overseen the agency’s  administrative and information/records management functions.  
Legislative Proposals to Restructure INS in the 106th Congress
There were three legislative proposals to restructure INS in the 106th Congress.  With
slight variations, all three proposals would have restructured INS to more clearly separate
the agency’s service and enforcement functions.  While two would have expanded and
elevated the immigration service (S. 1563 and H.R. 2680), another bill that was approved
in subcommittee markup (H.R. 3918) would have dismantled INS.  
The Immigration Reorganization and Improvement Act of 1999 (H.R. 3918) would
have dismantled INS and established a bureau of immigration services and a bureau of
immigration enforcement within the Department of Justice.  It was approved by the House
Judiciary’s Immigration and Claims Subcommittee on March 22, 2000.  This bill was
identical to H.R. 2528,as introduced by Representative Harold Rogers in July 1999, which
was approved by the House Immigration Subcommittee in September 1999.  The then
subcommittee chair, Representative Lamar Smith,  asserted that the introduction of H.R.
3918 was necessary, because the subcommittee amended version of H.R. 2528
represented a compromise negotiated with the Attorney General from which the
Administration pulled its support, stalling full committee markup.
Besides creating separate service and enforcement bureaus, the amended version of
H.R. 2528 would have also established an Office of the Associate Attorney General for
Immigration Affairs in DOJ.  This office would have coordinated the operations of not
only the two bureaus, but of the Executive Office for Immigration Review as well.5  Unlike
S. 1563, described below, the statutory responsibility for carrying out immigration service
and enforcement functions would have devolved from the INS Commissioner to bureau
directors, rather than be transferred to the Associate Attorney General. 
In contrast, H.R. 3918 would have dismantled INS, establishing two new bureaus in
DOJ, without establishing an Associate Attorney General’s office to coordinate and
oversee immigration service and enforcement operations.  The Bureau of Immigration
Services would have been responsible for processing and adjudicating family- and
employment-based immigrant petitions, nonimmigrant visa changes of status and
extensions of stay, naturalization applications, refugee and asylum applications, and service
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center operations.  The Bureau of Immigration Enforcement would have been responsible
for the activities and operations currently carried out by the Border Patrol, inspections,
investigations, detention and deportation, and intelligence programs.  
In each bureau, the bill would have also established six offices:  1) chief budget
officer; 2) general counsel; 3) policy and strategy; 4) congressional, intergovernmental, and
public affairs; 5) community liaison; and 6) statistics.  It would have also required the
Attorney General to report to the House and Senate appropriations committees on the
“proposed division and transfer of funds, including unexpended funds, appropriations, and
fees.”  Furthermore, the Attorney General would have been required to report to the
committees on the feasibility of transferring INS’s detention operations to BOP.  
The INS Reform and Border Security Act of 1999 (S. 1563) was introduced on
August 5, 1999 by Senator Abraham, the then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary’s
immigration  subcommittee, and cosponsored by Senator Kennedy, the then ranking
minority member.   The Subcommittee held a hearing on this proposal on September 23,
1999.  This bill would have reconstituted and elevated INS as an Immigration Affairs
Agency at the Department of Justice.  Like H.R. 2528, it would have created two bureaus:
one for immigration services, the other for enforcement.  Unlike H.R. 2528, however, the
Associate Attorney General would have statutorily assumed all of the Attorney General’s
immigration responsibilities.  The Associate Attorney General for Immigration Affairs
would have been made responsible for providing resources to both bureaus, coordinating
shared resources and records management, and formulating policy and planning.
The Bureau of Immigration Service and Adjudication would have been responsible
for processing visa petitions, naturalization applications, asylum/refugee applications,
parole/detention of asylum applicants, and service center operations.  The bill would have
also established an ombudsman’s office in the service bureau.  The Bureau of Enforcement
and Border Affairs would have been made responsible for Border Patrol, detention,
deportation, intelligence, and investigation programs.  Unlike H.R. 2528, the inspections
program, because of its service and enforcement function, would have been housed in the
Associate Attorney General’s office.
The Immigration Restructuring and Accountability Act of 1999 (H.R. 2680) was
introduced by Representative Jackson-Lee, the ranking minority member on the House
Judiciary’s immigration subcommittee, on August 3, 1999.  This bill would have
restructured INS and, in its place, created a National Immigration Bureau at the
Department of Justice.  This new agency would have been headed by a Director who
would have been responsible for all functions performed currently by the INS
Commissioner.  Within the Director’s office, there would have been established an office
of community liaison to resolve issues that could not be resolved through ordinary
administrative channels.  Within this new bureau, there would have been four offices: 1)
adjudications, 2) enforcement, 3) prehearing services, and 4) shared services.
The office of immigration adjudications would have been organized into the following
divisions: 1) adjudications; 2) refugees, asylum, parole, and humanitarian affairs; and 3)
community relations.  Under H.R. 2680, the Inspections program would have been placed
under the adjudications division.  The office of immigration enforcement would have been
organized into the following divisions: 1) Border Patrol; 2) removal; 3) intelligence and
investigations; and 4) community relations.  The office of prehearing services would have
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been organized into the following divisions: 1) detention, 2) alternatives to detention, 3)
prehearing services, and 4) community relations.  It is notable that the creation of an office
of prehearing services would have isolated the detention function and mandated that
prehearing services be standardized and prioritized.
Issues for Congress
Would dismantling or restructuring the agency by separating the service and
enforcement functions increase managerial and budget efficiencies?  Or would it reverse
progress already achieved through increased funding and reform initiatives? 
On the one hand, by restructuring, lessons learned through efforts to reform the
asylum and naturalization processes could be transferred to other immigration benefit
adjudications. On the other hand, restructuring the agency at the field level, by dismantling
the current structure of regions, districts, and sectors, could shift energies and resources
from other useful initiatives (e.g., the direct mail program and records centralization) and,
in the final outcome, could decrease managerial and budget efficiencies.  
Would separating INS enforcement programs from service programs result in a
“rump” service program that would be ineffectual and underfunded?  
If separated today, the proposed immigrant services branch or bureau would be
comparatively small in terms of its budget and personnel compared to the enforcement
branch.  Today, the Adjudications and Nationality program, INS’s core service program,
is funded almost entirely through examination fees.  With large pending caseloads in key
adjudications, INS is currently processing claims that were received several years ago with
fees being collected for new claims that may not be adjudicated for several years in the
future.  As a result, providing adequate funding for immigration services and for the more
efficient management of fee receipts is likely to be an ongoing issue.  
If INS were to be restructured according to any plan, what would be accomplished
in terms of addressing problems identified by the National Academy of Public
Administration regarding budget planning, formulation, and execution? 
 
INS reported that it had streamlined budget execution according to recommendations
made by NAPA.  According to GAO, however, INS failed to anticipate through its budget
planning and formulation that the agency’s discretionary spending for day-to-day
operations would be significantly lower in FY1999 than in the previous year due to fully
hiring all funded positions.  Consequently, the agency experienced program budget
shortfalls in FY1999, in spite of budget increases.  If INS attempts to restructure before
adequately reforming its budget process, an already cumbersome and antiquated financial
management system could exacerbate inefficiencies and problems, rather than streamline
business processes and increase productivity.  On the other hand, if the agency were
dismantled or restructured, the bureaus’ smaller, individual budgets might be more
manageable.
